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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
lgnacio Jesse Sanchez, Ill, appeals from his conviction for first-degree 
murder. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Emergency responders alerted by a 9-1-1 call found two-year-old Azteca 
Atencio unconscious, not breathing, and without a heart beat. (Tr., vol. 11, p. 
2647, L. 15 - p. 2656, L. 5; p. 2656, L. 22 - p. 2662, L. 20; p. 2663, L. 13 - p. 
2668, L. 10; p. 2669, L. 23 - p. 2694, L. 14; p. 2710, L. 3 - p. 2712, L. 2; p. 2734, 
L. 6 - p. 2741, L. 6; p. 2820, L. 8 - p. 2824, L. 10; p. 2838, L. 21 - p. 2867, L. 8; 
State's Exhibits 4, 47, 100.) Azteca's body was covered with bruises of various 
sizes and at various stages of healing that had been inflicted at different times. 
(Tr., vol. II, p. 2686, L. 23 - p. 2688, L. 24; p. 2741, L. 7 - p. 2747, L., 4; p. 2770, 
L. 5-p.  2775, L. 8; p. 2798, L. 16-p. 2805, L. 9; p. 2825, Ls. 1-12; p. 2831, L.4 
- p. 2834, L. 16; p. 2883, L. 19 - p. 2896, L. 12; p. 3436, L. 23 - p. 3477, L. 19; 
p. 3478, L. 14 - p. 3485, L. 12; p. 3501, L. 17 - p. 3509, L. 15; State's Exhibits 4, 
6, 10, 50-57, 59.) The bruising and other injuries were the result of abuse. (Tr., 
VOI. II, p. 2897, L. 4 - p. 2898, L. 14; p. 3478, L. 14 - p. 3481, L. 17.) 
Azteca died. (Tr., vol. II, p. 2900, L. 22 - p. 2904, L. 14.) The autopsy 
showed multiple injuries, including: many bruises and contusions on the head 
and body (Tr., vol. II, p. 3436, L. 23 - p. 3477, L. 79; p. 3478, L. 14 - p. 3485, L. 
12; p. 3501, L. 17 - p. 3509, L. 15; State's Exhibits 50 - 57, 59, 61-65); a 
fractured arm and skull (Tr., vol. II, p. 3509, L. 16 - p. 3511, L. 20); internal 
bruising and bleeding caused by external trauma (Tr., vol. II, p. 3511, L. 21 - p. 
3519, L. 16; State's Exhibits 67-68); and bleeding in the skull and bruising of the 
brain, which ultimately caused Azteca's death (Tr., vol. II, p. 3519, L. 17 - p. 
3531, L. 17; p. 3535, L. 16 - p. 3536, L. 15; State's Exhibits 69-71). 
At the time of Azteca's death her mother was in jail and Sanchez was the 
primary caregiver. (Tr., vol. II, p. 3083, L. 3 - p. 3116, L. 16; p. 3407, L. 19 - p. 
3414, L. 21.) Azteca complained to her mother, in several phone conversations 
shortly before her death, that her tummy hurt. (Tr., p. 3116, L. 17 - p. 3149, L. 
15; State's Exhibits 85, 87A-F, 88, 89.) Sanchez also made incriminating 
statements indicating he was the source of Azteca's injuries. (Tr., vol. II, p. 2937, 
L. 5 - p. 2953, L. 21; State's Exhibits 37A and 37B.) 
A grand jury indicted Sanchez for first-degree murder. (R., vol. I, pp. 11- 
13.) The grand jury also found probable cause of statutory aggravators, and the 
state filed notice of intent to seek the death penalty. (R., vol. I, pp. 14-15, 28-30.) 
The matter proceeded to a jury trial. (R., vol. II, pp. 308-32, 337-55, 358-72, 374- 
400; vol. Ill, pp. 401-06, 410-33.) The jury found Sanchez guilty of first degree 
murder. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 434-36.) In the penalty phase of the trial the jury found 
two statutory aggravators, but could not reach a unanimous decision as to a third 
aggravator or whether the aggravators outweighed mitigation such that the death 
penalty was appropriate. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 437-71.) Because the jury found 
statutory aggravators, the district court imposed the mandatory fixed life penalty. 
(R., vol. Ill, pp. 474-76.) Sanchez filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 
477-79.) 
ISSUES 
Sanchez states the issue on appeal as: 
I. Whether the admission of the hearsay statements of the 
decedent violated the confrontation clause since they were 
testimonial under Crawford and Davis. 
II. Whether the district court erred in admitting 32 morbid 
photos of the decedent because they were either not relevant or 
were unduly prejudicial and cumulative. 
Ill. Whether the court erred by admitting the tape of the 91 1 call 
because it was not relevant to any issue in the case. 
IV. Whether the doctrine of cumulative error requires reversal of 
the conviction. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
1. Has Sanchez failed to show that the statements of a two-year-old girl to 
her mother over the phone are the testimonial equivalent of answering police 
questions in an investigative interview? 
2. During the trial the state presented several photographs of the numerous 
injuries inflicted on Azteca to show various elements of its charge, including that 
Azteca was the victim of torture. Has Sanchez failed to show that the district 
court abused its discretion in allowing admission of the photographs? 
3. During the trial the state admitted a recording of the 9-1-1 call that initially 
summoned assistance for Azteca. No relevance objection was made before the 
district court. Should this Court decline to review this claim of error? 
4. Has Sanchez failed to show error, much less cumulative error? 
ARGUMENT 
Azteca's Statements To Her Mother In Phone Conversations Were Not 
Testimonial 
A. Introduction 
Sanchez contends that Azteca's statements to her mother in several 
phone calls shortly before Azteca's death were testimonial, and therefore should 
have been excluded under the Confrontation Clause. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7- 
23.) Specifically, Sanchez argues that all statements describing past events are 
testimonial, and that a two-year-old child's complaints to her mother about pain 
and abuse "are the functional equivalent to an adult going to the police to report a 
crime after the fact." (Appellant's brief, p. 19.) Sanchez's proposed legal 
standards are unsupported by existing law. Applying the actual legal standards 
for determining whether a statement is testimonial shows that admission of the 
evidence in question did not infringe on Sanchez's rights under the Confrontation 
Clause. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When reviewing a claimed violation of the Confrontation Clause the 
appellate court defers to the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, 
but gives free review to the trial court's legal determinations. State v. Hoo~er, 
145 Idaho 139, 141, 176 P.3d 911,913 (2007). 
C. Application Of The Correct Leqal Standards Shows No Violation Of The 
Confrontation Clause 
The Confrontation Clause prevents the government from using evidence 
of out-of-court testimonial statements unless the declarant is unavailable and the 
defendant has had the prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford v. 
Washinqton, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004); State v. Hoo~er, 145 ldaho 139, 143, 176 
P.3d 911, 915 (2007). The primary evil at which the Clause is aimed is the 
government's gathering of ex parfe evidence with the purpose of using that 
evidence at a later trial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-52; Hooper, 145 ldaho at 143, 
176 P.3d at 915. A statement is testimonial when the circumstances surrounding 
the making of the statement objectively show that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to gather evidence for use in prosecution. Davis v. Washinaton, 
547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); Hooper, 145 ldaho at 143-44, 176 P.3d at 915-16. 
Thus, statements made in response to police questioning while police are 
investigating a crime are testimonial, but statements made to police or their 
agents while the declarant is seeking emergency assistance are not. Davis, 547 
U.S. at 822; Hooper, 145 ldaho at 143-44, 176 P.3d at 915-16. Likewise, 
"[s]tatements to friends and neighbors about abuse and intimidation, and 
statements to physicians in the course of receiving treatment" are not testimonial. 
Giles v. California, - U.S. , , 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2692-93 (2008). 
Some of the circumstances considered in making the determination of 
whether a statement is testimonial include the purpose of the interview and the 
similarities of the interview to live testimony. Hooper, 145 ldaho at 143-44, 176 
P.3d at 915-16. Courts that have considered the issue have applied these 
circumstances to universally conclude that statements by a child to a parent are 
not testimonial. &e, e~., Clarke v. United States, 943 A.2d 555, 557-58 
(D.C.App. 2008) (spontaneous declaration to mother about battery not 
testimonial); Aclilera v. State, 862 N.E.2d 298, 305-06 (Ind. App. 2007) 
(statements to mother and grandmother not testimonial because not obtained for 
purposes of prosecution); Bishoo v. State, 982 So. 2d 371, 374-75 (Miss. 2008) 
(statements to mother and therapist about father's sexual abuse not testimonial); 
In re: N.D.C., 229 S.W.3d 602, 605-06 (Mo. 2007) (absent involvement of 
government or law enforcement, statements by child to mother are not 
testimonial); State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 777-78 (N.J. 2008) (unprompted 
statement "Daddy beat me" made by three-year-old to mother not testimonial); 
State v. Muttart, 875 N.E.2d 944, 956-57 (Ohio 2007) (statements to mother, 
family friends, and medical providers about sexual abuse were not testimonial). 
In this case, Azteca complained to her mother of physical pain in her 
"tummy" in the days leading up to her death, and also complained of her 
treatment by Sanchez. (Tr., p. 3116, L. 17 - p. 3149, L. 15; State's Exhibits 85, 
87A-F, 88, 89.) Her mother was not an agent of law enforcement; her mother did 
not interrogate her for the purpose of gathering evidence; there is no reason to 
believe Azteca's or her mother's purpose was to preserve evidence for 
prosecution; and there were no similarities in the statements to the formalities of 
live testimony. None of the circumstances present in the making of the 
statements indicate that the statements were the functional equivalent of 
testimony. Sanchez has failed to show a violation of the Confrontation Clause. 
11. 
Sanchez Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court's 
Decision To Admit Photogra~hs Of Azteca's Manv lniuries 
A. Introduction 
Sanchez argues that the state admitted "too many" pictures.' (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 32-33.) First, he argues that State's Exhibits 46 (photo of seal on body 
bag) and 4 (photograph showing Azteca's front, with hair, used for identification), 
6 (showing emergency room personnel working on Azteca) and 47 (photograph 
showing Azteca's front, without hair, used for identification) were irrelevant. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 31-32.) Second, he argues that photographs of her many 
injuries (State's Exhibits 7, 10, 48-73) were unduly prejudicial or cumulative. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 31-35.) Sanchez's arguments are without merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo, but other questions of 
admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
m, 129 ldaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Lamphere, 130 
ldaho 630, 632, 945 P.2d 1, 3 (1997); State v. MacDonald, 131 ldaho 367, 956 
P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1998). 
' Apparently included among the 32 pictures Sanchez claims were "too many" are 
State's Exhibit 5, a photograph of how Sanchez looked at the time of the crime 
and used by the state for identification purposes, and State's Exhibits 8 and 9, 
which were neither submitted nor admitted at trial (Tr., vol. II, p. 1-1 1; R., vol. Ill, 
p. 484). (Appellant's brief, pp. 27-28.) Thus, there were 28 photographs of 
Azteca and one photograph of the seal on the body bag admitted at trial. 
C. Sanchez's Claim That Photoara~hs Of The Seal On The Body Baa And 
Photoaraphs Of Azteca Used For Identification Were Irrelevant Is Without 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. Unless 
otherwise excluded by the Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence is admissible. 
I.R.E. 402. Evidence is relevant if it is necessary to tell the complete story of the 
circumstances of a crime. State v. Izatt, 96 ldaho 667, 670, 534 P.2d 1107, 11 10 
(1975); State v. Blackstead, 126 ldaho 14, 17-19, 878 P.2d 188, 191-193 (Ct. 
App. 1994). 
The identification photographs and photograph of the seal on the body 
bag have a tendency to show both that Azteca's body was the one seen by the 
various witnesses and that the condition of the body had not been manipulated or 
altered during its handling. Sanchez does not contest this. Instead, he argues 
only that the evidence was not relevant because he "was not disputing" the chain 
of custody, the identity of the body, or the presence of certain medical care 
providers during her treatment at the hospital. (Appellant's brief, pp. 30-31 .*) 
Sanchez's argument is has no basis in law. The fact a defendant is "not 
disputing" certain facts does not make those facts or evidence establishing them 
irrelevant. The state bore the burden of proving this crime. That the defense did 
Sanchez offers no showing from the record that the facts demonstrated by the 
evidence at issue were "undisputed." The defense offered no stipulations to 
those facts. Apparently Sanchez's argument is apparently that he offered no 
evidence to refute the state's evidence, and therefore the state's evidence was 
undisputed and therefore irrelevant. 
not "dispute" that the body upon which the autopsy was conducted belonged to 
Azteca, and that the injuries found by the pathologist were caused before her 
death, were facts relevant to the determination of this case, whether "disputed or 
not. A defendant cannot prevent the state from proving its case by evidence 
even with a stipulation. People v. Scheid, 16 ~ a l . 4 ' ~  1, 17 (1997) ("The general 
rule is that the prosecution in a criminal case cannot be compelled to accept a 
stipulation if the effect would be to deprive the state's case of its persuasiveness 
and forcefulness.") (internal quotation omitted); People v. Thornton, 85 
C a l . ~ p ~ . 4 ' ~  4, 48 (Cal.App., 4th Dist., 2000) ("Nor are we prepared to revert to 
the outmoded notion that a criminal defendant may limit the prosecution's 
evidence by 'not putting things at issue."'); Mills v. State, 615 S.E.2d 824, 827 
(Ga. App. 2005) ("Moreover, 'a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his 
way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the [state] chooses to present 
it ... [or] undermine the credibility of the State's story by selectively admitting 
certain incriminating evidence to prevent the jury from receiving that evidence."' 
(brackets and ellipses original) (quoting Ross v. State, 614 S.E.2d 31 (Ga. 
2005)); Peoale v. Hilts, 532 N.Y.S.2d 269, 274-76 (N.Y.A.D., 2d Dept, 1988) 
("oveiwhelming weight of authority" provides that defendant may not prevent 
presentation of evidence by offer to stipulate to facts). Sanchez's argument that 
evidence was rendered "irrelevant" because it went to "undisputed facts is 
without merit. 
D. The Photoqra~hs Of Azteca's lniuries Were Properly Admitted 
Sanchez has shown no basis for excluding the photographs of the injuries 
he inflicted on Azteca. Relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the district 
court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice -- which is the tendency to 
suggest a decision on an improper basis -- substantially outweighs the probative 
value of the evidence. I.A.R. 403; State v. Floyd, 125 ldaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 
905, 907 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 ldaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 
348 (Ct. App. 1993). 
The trial court has the discretion to admit into evidence 
photographs of the victim in a homicide case as an aid to the jury in 
arriving at a fair understanding of the evidence, as proof of the 
corpus delicti, the extent of injury, the condition of the body, and for 
their bearing on the question of the degree and atrociousness of 
the crime. The fact that the photographs depict the actual body of 
the victim and the wounds inflicted on 'the victim and may tend to 
excite the emotions of the jury is not a basis for excluding them. 
State v. Winn, 121 ldaho 850, 853, 828 P.2d 879, 882 (1992); see also State v. 
Hawkins, 131 ldaho 396,402, 958 P.2d 22,28 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Some of the photographs were admitted or discussed during the testimony 
of the first responders, police, or hospital care providers. (See, ea., Tr., vol. 11, p. 
2710, L. 3 - p. 2720, L. 6; p. 2798, L. 16 - p. 2805, L. 9; p. 2831, L. 4 - p. 2834, 
L. 16; p. 2919, L. 23 - p. 2921, L. 13; p. 2999, L. 24 - p. 3004, L. 25; State's 
Exhibits 4, 6, 10, 46, 47.) This was primarily to show identity and the extent of 
the injuries as they appeared when those witnesses dealt with Azteca or her 
body. 
Most of the photographs at issue were admitted or discussed during the 
testimony of the pathologist. (Tr., vol. II, p. 3436, L. 23 - p. 3477, L. 19; p. 3478, 
L. 14-p.3485, L. 12;p.3501,L. 17-p.3531,L. 17;p.3535, L. 16-p.3536,L. 
15; State's Exhibits 48-71.) These photographs show specific injuries (internal 
and external) and illustrate the pathologist's testimony about the trauma he found 
had been inflicted upon Azteca while she was alive. 
Sanchez relies on vague and conclusory claims that the photographs ran 
the risk of inflaming the jury and that fewer photographs could have adequately 
shown the injuries. (Appellant's brief, pp. 31-35.) He has failed, however, to 
show that any of the photographs exceed the scope of the district court's 
discretion. On the contrary, review of the record shows that the sheer magnitude 
and number of injuries Sanchez inflicted on Azteca, combined with the state's 
burden of proving that Sanchez murdered Azteca by torture, demonstrates the 
need for each and every photograph. Sanchez has failed to show that the district 
court abused its discretion. 
111. 
Sanchez Did Not Preserve His Appellate Claim That The 9-1-1 Recordins Was 
Irrelevant 
Sanchez claims on appeal that the 9-1-1 recording admitted at trial was 
irrelevant. (Appellant's brief, pp. 35-38.) Sanchez also argues, in passing, that 
the recording was unduly prejudicial, although he does not articulate what 
prejudice could have flowed from it. (Appellant's brief, p. 38.) These objections, 
however, were not preserved for appellate review. 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). It is equally 
well settled that the appellate court "will not 'review a trial court's alleged error on 
appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for 
an assignment of error."' State v. Barnes, 133 ldaho 378, 384, 987 P.2d 290, 
296 (1999) (quoting State v. Fisher, 123 ldaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 
(1 993)). 
Whether an issue was preserved presents a "threshold inquiry. State v. 
Stevens, 115 ldaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989) (objections at 
trial on other grounds did not preserve issue raised on appeal). The admission of 
evidence cannot be found to be erroneous in the absence of a timely objection 
clearly "stating the specific ground of objection," unless the ground is apparent 
from the context. I.R.E. 103(a)(l); State v. Gleason, 130 ldaho 586, 592, 944 
P.2d 721, 727 (Ct. App. 1997). Likewise, an objection on one ground will not 
preserve a separate and different basis for excluding evidence. State v. Norton, 
134 ldaho 875, 880, 11 P.3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Enveart, 123 
ldaho 452, 454, 849 P.2d 125, 127 (Ct. App. 1993) (limiting appellate review to 
scope of objection). The reason for making a specific objection "is to alert the 
trial court and the other party to the grounds of the objection so that it may be 
addressed or cured." United States v. Walters, 904 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 
1990). This requirement should "obviate the need for proceedings at the 
appellate level." Jack 5. Weinstein, Weinstein's Federal Evidence 3 103.02[2] 
(2nd ed. 2004). 
Sanchez relies upon a portion of the argument by trial counsel to claim 
that the issue of relevancy of the 9-1-1 recording was raised. (Appellant's brief, 
p. 36 ("The defense objected in part because it did not understand why the tape 
was being admitted. (Tr., 6/15/05, p. 261.)").) Reading the record in its entirety 
shows that Sanchez is reading that portion of the argument out of context, and 
that there was never an objection based on relevancy of the 9-1-1 recording or 
undue prejudice. In addition, it is clear from the record that Sanchez obtained no 
adverse ruling as a basis for raising this claim on appeal. 
The state filed a motion in limine to address the admissibility of the 9-1-1 
recording. (R., vol. 11, pp. 217-18.) The district court scheduled a hearing on the 
motion. (R., vol. II, p. 238.) At the hearing the district court heard the recording 
and also heard arguments from the parties. (Supp. Tr., p. 253, L. 14 - p. 255, L. 
21.) The prosecutor, whose motion was pending, argued that there was no 
Confrontation Clause issue with admitting the recording. (Supp. Tr., p. 255, L. 22 
- p. 260, L. 25.) 
The defense first sought clarification of "what they [the prosecution] intend 
to use it for," because counsel did not know "where they would intend to play it." 
(Supp. Tr., p. 261, Ls. 3-7.) He noted that the state's motion did not clarify 
whether the prosecution intended to play the recording "in their case in chief or 
opening - hopefully they wouldn't try it at opening or something. They haven't 
said." (Supp. Tr., p. 261, Ls. 8-16.) The defense then argued the Confrontation 
Clause issue; that the state would have to lay foundation; and some concern 
about what light the recording put the defendant's mother. (Supp. Tr., p. 261, L. 
17 - p. 263, L. 14.) The defense attorney then continued: 
But I believe the State would be able to admit this if it lays a 
proper foundation and if it provides the witnesses that are involved 
in that tape for cross-examination. I think they'd have to produce 
them in their case in chief before the court could actually rule on the 
admissibility of the tape itself. 
And I just - I'm assuming what counsel is asking for is a 
pretrial ruling on the admissibility of the tape for entry in their case 
in chief. But they haven't actually said when they want to use it. 
(Supp. Tr., p. 263, L. 15 - p. 264, L. 1 .) 
The district judge responded to the defense argument by pointing out that 
before the court was "a Crawford issue" and that the state would have to lay 
foundation to get the tape in. (Supp. Tr., p. 264, Ls. 2-5.) Trial counsel for the 
defense acknowledged, "That's our position." (Supp. Tr., p. 264, L. 6.) After the 
presentation of one of the foundational witnesses (Supp. Tr., p. 264, L. 7 - p. 
268, L. 12), the state presented rebuttal argument, contending that it wished to 
stay focused on the Confrontation Clause issue (Supp. Tr., p. 268, L. 13 - p. 269, 
L. 25). After surrebuttal by the defense (Supp. Tr., p. 270, Ls. 2-14), the court 
stated there were two issues before it, one being proper foundation and the other 
being "the Crawford issue" (Supp. Tr., p. 270, L. 15 - p. 271, L. 20). The defense 
did not assert that the court was mischaracterizing its objection or omitting any 
claim it had made. The court later entered a written order finding that the tape 
was admissible as an excited utterance and that its admission did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause. (R., vol. 11, pp. 246-47.) 
The defense did not object to admission of the 9-1-1 recording on the 
basis of relevancy or undue prejudice. In context, the statement relied on by 
Sanchez on appeal was only a statement that trial counsel did not understand 
whether the prosecution intended to use the recording in its case in chief or in 
opening statement. The court clearly did not believe any issue of relevancy or 
undue prejudice was before it. When the court stated the two issues before it, 
trial counsel for the defense once actively agreed with the court and once made 
no comment. No ruling addressing relevancy or undue prejudice was made by 
the district court. A thorough review of the record shows that no relevance or 
undue prejudice objection was actually stated, comprehended, or ruled on below. 
Thus the issue is not preserved for appellate consideration. 
Sanchez Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To 
This Case 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. 
Martinez, 125 ldaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate 
to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. 
Hawkins, 131 ldaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Sanchez has failed to 
show that two or more errors occurred in his trial, and therefore the doctrine is 
inapplicable to this case. See, e.q., LaBelle v. State, 130 ldaho 115, 121, 937 
P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in the trial had been shown, they 
would not amount to a denial of due process that would require reversal. State v. 
m, 129 ldaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella, 
135 ldaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of errors 
deemed harmless). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Sanchez's conviction. 
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